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Massey: Wills and Trusts

W[LLS AND TRUSTS
I.

CoNTRAcTs

To W=

In the period under review, the South Carolina Supreme Court
decided two cases concerning alleged contracts to make wills.
The court reiterated existing principles of law, as both cases
turned on the sufficiency of the evidence.
In Caudker v. Know' Anna Caulder, 2 the original plaintiff,
was raised from infancy by her aunt, Anna Welsh, the owner of
a farm. Mrs. Caulder contended that she entered an oral contract with L. L. Knox, Mrs. Welsh's son. They allegedly agreed
that if Airs. Caulder would care for the ailing Mrs. Welsh, then
Knox would arrange for Mrs. Caulder and her children to receive the benefit of the farm. Relying on this agreement, Mrs.
Caulder moved into the Welsh home and cared for her aunt
until her death. After Mrs. Welsh's death, Knox became the sole
owner of the farm. He subsequently married the defendant,
Edna Knox. Six years after the marriage, he died intestate,
having made no provision to give the farm to Mrs. Caulder.
This action arose when Mrs. Caulder sought specific performance of the alleged oral contract. Her husband, who was present
at the alleged making of the contract, testified that Knox made
the promise.3 Three other citizens of the community testified
that on different occasions Knox had expressed his intention that
Mrs. Caulder was to receive the farm at his death.
The South Carolina Supreme Court in reviewing the evidence
cited the following rule from Young V. LeVy 4 as controlling in
this case:
The ordinary rule of preponderance or greater weight
of the evidence, applicable to civil actions generally,
is insufficient in this class of cases; some Courts require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as on the criminal
1. 251 S.C. 337, 162 S.E.2d 262 (1968).
2. Hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Caulder.
3. Raymond Caulder testified that the words of Knox were as follows:
[I]f you will come and look after Mama while I am away in the
daytime at work, when I am through with the place, I will have
it fixed where you will reap the benefit of it, and if you are not
living then, I will have it fixed where your children will reap the
benefit.
4. 206 S.C. 1, 32 S.E.2d 889 (1944).
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side; universally a higher degree of conviction of truth
is necessary than in the usual civil case.0
Reviewing the evidence in the light of this rule, the court concluded that the plaintiff had simply not proved by "clear, cogent
and convincing" testimony that a contract was ever consummated. The testimony of the three citizens carried little weight,
for the court stated that "[a] mere declaration of intent will not
7
give rise to a contract."
Havirdv. BohisselP8 concerned an alleged oral contract to make
mutual wills. In 1961, the plaintiff, her brother Lee Havird,
and another sister executed wills leaving their respective estates
to each other. After the death of the sister, in 1964, the plaintiff
and her brother again executed wills leaving their estates to each
other. In 1965 Lee Havird died, having executed a later will
under which the plaintiff received nothing. She contended that
the wills made in 1964 were made in compliance with and in
furtherance of an oral contract entered into in 1961, and prayed
for specific performance of that alleged contract.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, in refusing to grant the
requested relief, reaffirmed the standard of "clear, cogent and
convincing" proof. The mere existence of mutual wills is not
proof of a exntract, and a mere agreement to make mutual wills
falls far short of a contract to keep them in force. 9
II.

UNDUE INFLUENCE

In Havird v. Schissell,10 the later of two cases between the
same parties, the court also dealt with the degree of proof necessary to upset a will on the grounds of undue influence. Corrie
Lei Havird leveled a second attack against her brother's will.
Approximately one month before Havird's death the will was
executed, leaving his entire estate to his illegitimate sons and
their children.
Plaintiff contended that the later will was the product of
undue influence exerted by the sons. The principal evidence
was that one son persuaded him to enter the hospital after every5. Caulder v. Knox, 251 S.C. 337, 340, 162 S.E2d 262, 264 (1968), citing
Young v. Levy, 206 S.C. 1, 12, 32 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1944).

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Caulder v. Knox, 251 S.C. 337, 347, 162 S.E.2d 262, 267 (1968).
Id. at 345, 162 S.E.2d 266.
251 S.C. 416, 162 S.E.2d 877 (1968).
Looper v. Whitaker, 231 S.C. 219, 222, 98 S.E.2d 266, 267 (1957).
166 S.E.2d 801 (S.C. 1969).
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one else had tried and failed. Also, while Mr. Havird was in the
hospital his sons visited him frequently, on occasions performing
minor errands for him.
The court cited the rule of Smith v. Whetstone 1 as controlling
in this case:
Undue influence may be proved by circumstantial evidence, "[but] the circumstances relied on to show it must
be such as taken together point unmistakably and convincingly to the fact that the mind of the testator was
subjected to that of some other person, so the will is that
of the latter and not of the former."' 2
After viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
contestants of the will, the court found that there was not
enough evidence to raise a jury question. Therefore, the directed
verdict for the defendants was affirmed.
III. INSANE DELusIoNs

Corrie Lei Havird also requested an instruction to the jury on
the issue of monomania, or an insane delusion. 13 In brief, an
insane delusion which affects testamentary capacity is an idea
or belief which has no basis in fact, but which is nevertheless
adhered to by the testator against the weight of reason and
evidence. The will is invalidated only if it is the product of the
delusion. 14 The trial judge refused to make the charge and the
plaintiff appealed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
refusal, stating that the evidence did not warrant a charge on
monomania. 15 Although the court conceded that the doctrine of
insane delusions had not been applied in this state, it declined
to comment on whether it would be barred by stare decisis from
applying the doctrine in an appropriate case.
In the light of In Re Washingtoqns Estate, 6 it would appear
that a strict adherence to the rule of stare decisis would require
11. 209 S.C. 78, 39 S.E.2d 127 (1946).
12. Havird v. Schissell, 166 S.E.2d 801, 804 (S.C. 1969), quoting Smith v.

Whetstone, 209 S.C. 78, 83, 39 S.E2d 127, 129 (1946).
13. 166 S.E.2d 801 (S.C. 1969).
14. Havird v. Schissell, 166 S.E.2d 801, 807 (S.C. 1969).
15. Id. at 807. The testimony of a Mrs. Scurry was the only evidence offered

to prove that Mr. Havird was suffering from insane delusions. She testified
that before Mr. Havird was taken to the hospital, he was at times irrational,
and expressed the belief that people were trying to cheat and kill him. No
evidence was presented as to what people Mr. Havird suspected, or whether his
fears were real or imagined.
16. 212 S.C. 379, 46 S.E.2d 287 (1948).
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the court not to recognize the doctrine of insane delusions as
applicable in this state. In that case, as in the present one, the
supreme court upheld the trial court's refusal to grant instructions on monomania. The court felt that this doctrine would
open up a new area of attack on wills and would only serve to
complicate existing law. The court recognized authority for the
doctrine in other jurisdictions but deliberately declined to accept
that authority.
IV.

17
LEGIsLATION: UNIFORm A.NATOxIcAL GIT AcT

This act provides for gift by will of all or part of the testator's
body for medical purposes. Two sections of the act are pertinent
to this article.
One section of the act provides for the automatic effectiveness
of the gift on the testator's death without probate of the will.
If the will is then declared invalid for testamentary reasons,
the gift, if acted upon in good faith, is still valid.""
The act also provides for the revocation of the gift by destroying the original and all executed copies of the will, provided it
has not been delivered to the donee. If the will has been delivered,
the donor may revoke or amend his gift in several ways. An oral
or written statement sufficiently proved and communicated to
the donee will revoke the gift. Or, the gift may be revoked in
the usual manner provided for the amendment or revocation of
wills.' 0
V.

TRusTs: PRINCIPAL AND INCOME

20
In the case of Soutk7 Carolina National Bank v. Arrington,
the South Carolina Supreme Court was faced with the problem
of allocation of receipts of a trust between principal and income.
John W. Arrington died leaving a will which, after the bequest
of certain personal property to his wife, provided for the rest
and residue of his estate to be held in trust. After the death of
all of the income beneficiaries, thq trust was to terminate and
the corpus and any undistributed income was to be paid to the
issue of his three sons, per stirpes.
This case arose when the bank sought a judgment declaring
that capital gains from the sale of stocks, stock dividends, and

17. R507, July 1, 1969.

18. R507 § 4(a) (July 1, 1969).

19. R507 § 6 (July 1, 1969).
20. 165 S.E.2d 77 (S.C. 1968).
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stock splits received by the trust should be distributed to the
remaindermen. The widow of one of the income beneficiaries
answered, alleging that the capital gains should be apportioned
between the income beneficiaries and the remaindermen, consistent with Cothran v. South Carolina National Bank.2 1 The
master held that Arrington in his will expressed an intent that
all such gains should be treated as corpus and that the trustee
could distribute them to the remaindermen. The report of the
master was affirmed and the widow appealed.
The supreme court dealt first with the stock splits. The
Pennsylvania case of In Re Tmust Estate of Pew, 22 which held
that stock splits should not be apportioned between the life
tenant of the trust and the remaindermen but should be allocated
to corpus, was endorsed by the court.23 By so holding, the case
law concerning stock splits occurring prior to the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act was brought into line with that
24
statutory rule.
In considering the capital gains from stock sales, the court
held that the testator's intent as expressed in his will was that
such proceeds should be treated as corpus. The will gave the
trustees power to sell securities but directed them to hold and
reinvest the proceeds. Since distribution was prohibited, the
court concluded that the testator intended such proceeds to be
absorbed into the corpus.
In considering stock dividends, however, the court held that
the testator had evinced no intent that such dividends should be
allocated to corpus. The item of the will giving the trustees the
power to deal with the trust estate as the testator might have
done if living, was not construed to give the trustees the power
to allocate proceeds between principal and income. The court
concluded that since no intent was expressed in the will, the
stock dividends should be apportioned according to the Cothran
decision. 25
21. 242 S.C. 80, 130 S.E.2d 177 (1963).
22. 398 Pa. 523, 158 A.2d 552 (1960).

23. South Carolina National Bank v. Arrington, 165 S.E.2d 77, 81 (S.C.

1968), citing In Re Trust Estate of Pew, 398 Pa. 523, 530, 158 A.2d 552, 556
(1960). The reason the court cited the allocating stock splits to corpus was
that a split does not represent a division of corporate earnings or profits. A
simple division of the shares of stock takes place without any change of the
earned surplus or capital accounts on the corporate books.
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 67-509 (a) (Supp. 1968). The Revised Uniform
Principal and Income Act treats stock splits as principal.
25. Cothran v. South Carolina National Bank, 242 S.C. 80, 90, 130 S.E2d
177, 181 (1963), citing the Pennsylvania rule as expressed in In Re Nird-
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The South Carolina National Bank presented voluminous
testimony aimed at overthrowing the CotAran decision. Its primary contention was that the common law rule should be brought
into concert with the Revised Uniform Principal and Income
Act. The court rejected the evidence illustrating the inequities
and unreasonable burdens caused by the Cothan case and declined to overthrow a rule established by prior decisions. 20
The bank also contended that since the stock dividends were
not paid to the income beneficiary during his lifetime, the undistributed income should go to the remaindermen. The basis
for this contention was that the will provided for any accumulation of undistributed income to be paid to the remaindermen
upon the termination of the trust. The court dismissed this
contention by stating that the term "undistributed income"
meant income which had been properly accumulated, not accumulated because of the trustee's failure to pay out the income in
27
accordance with the terms of the trust.

According to the excellent dissent of Justice Bussey, if the
Cotran case had been as fully argued as the present case, it
"would have at least been to some extent modified." 28 He fully
realized that the Pennsylvania rule can work hardships and
inequities and put an undue burden upon the trust estate itself,
"results clearly not contemplated or intended"29 by the testator.
Nevertheless, the court reaffirmed the Cothan decision and
also adopted the Pennsylvania rule that stock splits should be
treated as corpus. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the Cot&ran case
controls prior to the effective date of the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act.
VI. TRUSTS: CommissIONs
In Dunlap v. Peoples NationaZ Bank,"° the settlor placed a
large amount of property in a revocable trust with the Peoples
linger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 A. 200 (1927). The Cothran decision requires
the trustee to apportion the stock dividend so that the intact value of the
trust's original investment in the stock is unchanged, and then to pay the
remainder of the stock dividend to the life income beneficiary.
26. South Carolina National Bank v. Arrington, 165 S.E.2d 77, 82 (S.C.
1968). The failure to overrule Cothran leaves two distinctly different rules
applicable to stock dividends. Those dividends received before the effective
date of the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act are to be apportioned
according to Cothran. Those dividends received after the effective date are to
be allocated to corpus according to the terms of that act.
27. South Carolina National Bank v. Arrington, 165 S.E.2d 77, 83 (S.C.
1968).
28. Id. at 86 (dissenting opinion).
29. Id. at 87 (dissenting opinion).
30. 166 S.E.2d 313 (S.C. 1969).
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National Bank as trustee. The trust agreement provided for a
set schedule of fees. More than ten years after the creation of the
trust, the settlor was adjudged incompetent. The bank was then
appointed committee for those assets of the settlor not subject to
the trust, and was further authorized to continue as trustee for
the trust estate. When the settlor died, the bank sought to be discharged as committee and trustee and petitioned the court to
award the statutory committee commissions for both the trusts
and committee assets.
In an unusual decision that cited no cases on this point the
supreme court reviewed the master's report and the testimony
that comprised the committeeship hearing. The court held that
the trustee was entitled only to the agreed commission on the
trust estate. 31
In the master's committee hearing, a trust officer of the bank
testified to the willingness of the bank to continue as trustee at
the same rate of compensation provided in the trust instrument.
The master then ratified the trust agreement and separately
appointed the bank as committee. The bank was required to
submit two separate accountings to the court, one as trustee and
another as committee. In light of this evidence, the supreme
court concluded that the trustee was entitled only to the agreed
compensation for handling the trust estate.
VII. TRUSTS: Fomrmuls
In the case of Hardin v. Horger,32 a local congregation seceded
from The Methodist Church and affiliated with another conference. Officials of The Methodist Church brought an action
to enjoin the local congregation from using or disposing of the
church property except as members of The Methodist Church.
The local church contended that the Annual Conference's handling of an affair involving immoral conduct by a minister was
not consistent with the proper action contemplated by the
Discipline of The Methodist Church. The local congregation
asserted that under the provisions of a trust clause33 in the deed
31. The commission set in the trust instrument was substantially smaller
than the statutory committee's commission would have been.
32. 166 S.E.2d 215 (S.C. 1969).

33. Id. at 217. The deed to the church property contained the following trust
clause:
In trust that the said premises shall be used, kept, and maintained and disposed of as a place of divine worship for the use of
the ministry and membership of The Methodist Episcopal Church,
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by which the property was acquired, The Methodist Church
forfeited its right to the property.
The supreme court held that The Methodist Church, its officials, ministry and membership were entitled to the church
property. The primary consideration in this decision was the
absence in the deed to the property of conditions or conditions
subsequent sufficient to create a forfeiture. The court stated
that it is the rule in this state that forfeitures will be allowed
only where the intent is clear and there is no other reasonable
construction of the deed. " The court further concluded that
under the plain language of the deed, The Methodist Church was
the beneficiary of the trust clause and the local congregation's
right to the church property was contingent upon its retaining
membership in The Methodist Church.
RAYMOND DAVID MASSEY

South, subject to the Discipline, usage and ministerial appointments of the said Church, as from time to time authorized and
declared by the General Conference of the said Church, and the
Annual Conference within whose bounds the said premises are
situated.
The Methodist Church is the legal successor of the Methodist Episcopal
Church, South. Turbeville v. Morris, 203 S.C. 287, 317, 26 S.E2d 821, 833
(1943).
34. Hardin v. Horger, 166 S.E.2d 215, 218 (S.C. 1969).
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